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Abstract
Within the WHIM project, we study fictional ideation: pro-
cesses for automatically inventing, assessing and presenting
fictional ideas. Here we examine the foundational notion of
the plausibility of fictional ideas, by performing an empirical
study to surface the factors that affect judgements of plau-
sibility. Our long term aim is to formalise a computational
method which captures some intuitive notions of plausibil-
ity and can predict how certain types of people will assess
the plausibility of certain types of fictional ideas. This paper
constitutes a first firm step towards this aim.
Introduction
In Llano et al. (2016), we define a successful fictional idea as
“one that presents a character, event or scenario that trans-
forms or distorts the ‘real’ world in the imagination of the
reader without requiring him or her to leave it entirely”. In
the WHIM project (an acronym for The What-if Machine),
we are undertaking the first large-scale study of how soft-
ware can invent, evaluate and express fictional ideas with
real cultural value (www.whim-project.eu). We have identi-
fied plausibility as one of the key dimensions of fictionality,
and so investigating questions of plausibility is important for
the aims of the WHIM project. Unfortunately, plausibility
resists a simple definition. Here, we explore the factors that
support the perception of a machine-generated fictional idea
as plausible or implausible.
Plausibility in fictional scenarios is different from notions
of probability, which rely on modelling situations in terms
of relative frequency, or the updating of prior distributions.
Judgements about plausibility in fictional situations involve
a process of interpretation, where the reader makes – per-
haps implicit – subjective decisions about the underspeci-
fied fictional universe. For example, in the absurdist play
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, Rosencrantz bets
“heads” on a coin flip 92 times in a row, and wins each time.
If presented as a factual news story, this would likely both be
judged as implausible and mathematically improbable (al-
beit no more improbable than any other session of 92 coin
flips). However, within the context of the play, we’re invited
to consider a fictional world in which this highly improbable
chain of events is plausible, i.e., it actually happens.
Following an overview of prior research, we propose
some candidate factors to capture how people assess the
plausibility of fictional statements. We then report on how
these were used in an exploratory study, where 20 partici-
pants were asked to categorisation a set of fictional ideas –
both machine- and human- generated – into four plausibil-
ity categories and interviewed about their judgements. We
then examine these judgements from two distinct perspec-
tives: (1) a grounded theory analysis that identifies several
factors they considered relevant to plausibility; (2) a multidi-
mensional scaling analysis that suggests several factors that
can explain differences between how fictional ideas were as-
sessed. Finally – as per Rothbauer (2008) – we triangulate
the outcomes of these analyses and our initial theories, lead-
ing to a final set of factors. We conclude with a discussion
of the relevance of this work for further research on fictional
ideation and Computational Creativity in general.
Background
Connell and Keane (2004) carried out an empirical study of
plausibility. They first evaluated the concept coherence of a
set of events written as two connected sentences, e.g.,
The bottle fell off the shelf. The bottle smashed.
These were classified according to different types of infer-
ences; the sentence above references a causal inference,
while the sentence pair
The bottle fell off the shelf. The bottle was pretty.
references an attributal inference. Their results supported
the received view that concept coherence is important in
plausibility judgements, and showed that different inference
types differentially affect plausibility. A second experiment
evaluated word coherence rather than concept coherence,
but this experiment found no reliable effect of word coher-
ence on plausibility.
Connell and Keane note that their studies used “the term
plausible interchangeably with other descriptions such as
appropriate, sensible, or makes sense.” Our approach dif-
fers considerably from theirs, as they focused on statements
whose two constituent parts have a strong conceptual rela-
tion. In contrast, as the fictional statements evaluated in this
paper have not been conceived with such restrictions, this
has allowed for a more comprehensive analysis.
Lombardi, Nussbaum, and Sinatra (2015) have sought to
outline a primarily theoretical model for plausibility judge-
ments. In particular, they examine the role such judgements
play in conceptual change, and come to understand plau-
sibility as meaning: ‘what is perceived to be potentially
truthful when evaluating explanations’. They cite Nicholas
Rescher’s observation that a statement deemed to be plau-
sible, or potentially truthful, indicates that there has been a
‘highly provisional and conditional epistemic inclination to-
wards it’ (Rescher 1976).
In sum, there seem to be myriad criteria upon which peo-
ple may base judgements of plausibility. Some factors in an
individual’s judgement appear to be highly subjective, of-
ten being heavily influenced by personal circumstances, re-
ligious belief, cultural background, or political sympathies.
Indeed, while most people feel they have an understanding
of plausibility, that understanding is almost always desta-
bilised when an individual tries to apply consistent criteria
to analyse the plausibility of various sample statements.
Plausibility is closely connected with the notion of inter-
pretation: that is, a given interpretation of a given scenario
is deemed “plausible” if potentially valid, under a given set
of assumptions. Interpretation of conventional symbols is
highly constrained. However, creative interpretations may
be almost endlessly fanciful. To take one example: the sci-
ence fiction author Philip K. Dick suggests in several of
his written works that we continue to live in biblical times,
evidence of which can only be accessed by visionary ex-
perience (Dick 1995). This interpretation of the world is
grounded in the data of personal perception and reflection.
Nevertheless, most people would find such an interpretation
implausible if presented as anything other than fiction.
Eco argued that the world, history, and texts have con-
straints on their plausible interpretations, despite the wide
range of possible interpretations. He posits that fiction and
reality intersect in the following way: “We can make true
statements about fictional characters because what happens
to them is recorded in a text, and a text is like a musical
score” (Eco 2009). Music shows us that a creative work can
take on a life of its own through interpretation. Fictional
characters can also “become individuals living outside their
original scores,” or, to put it more formally: “a fictional char-
acter is a semiotic object.”
We can thus make chains of interpretations about fic-
tional characters and other elements of fictional worlds. In
the first instance, the validity of such interpretations is not
“grounded” in real-world facts, but in the fictive notions of
the fictional world – subject also to the perceptions, beliefs,
and other features of the interpreting agent. When instigat-
ing behaviour (including storytelling behaviour), certain in-
terpretations may be predicted, based in part on a prelimi-
nary interpretation of those agents who are expected to per-
ceive the behaviour (Kockelman 2012).
We believe it is important for Computational Creativity
researchers to tackle issues related to fictional interpreta-
tions, in particular to ask what kinds of interpretations are
useful (Eco 2006) – rather than merely true. Although sub-
jectivity plays a role, keeping in mind Eco’s remarks on lim-
its of interpretation, we think that the reader’s perception of
a text’s plausibility will often draw on the text’s objective
features, and we develop this theme below.
Candidate Factors
As a first step, we conducted an introspective study to iden-
tify an initial set of factors that may be involved in hu-
man plausibility judgements. These candidate factors helped
guide the design of the exploratory study, described below.
Eight fictional statements were used. Four were from the
What-If Machine and four were summaries of well known
literary works, included to foster the generalisability of the
findings. The machine-generated statements were selected
for quality and diversity, to showcase a range of potentially
relevant factors.
Three of the authors independently read the statements
and rated each sentence 1–5 in terms of how plausible they
were (1= low plausibility and 5 = high plausibility). They
also wrote a commentary for each statement, describing
their rationale for that score, their scoring process (includ-
ing whether they had revised a score during analysis), and a
set of labels that described relevant properties, dimensions
or features. By comparing our individual answers, we found
a common set of factors that appeared to affect our plausi-
bility judgements, listed below.
Complexity The level of elaboration of the idea in terms
of the amount of narrative detail that it is composed of. Our
intuition is that a larger number of statements, or narrative
details, used to compose an idea reduces its plausibility. An
illustrative example is the statement:
“What if there was a poor orphan girl who was abused by her
aunt, sent away to school where conditions were harsh, before be-
coming a governess and marrying her employer, who was already
married to a mentally ill woman whom he has locked up in his
house?” (1)
Each part is rather plausible, but their conjunction renders
the overall idea less plausible. We hypothesise that there is
a negative correlation between complexity and plausibility.
Universality The scope of an idea, in terms of how general
people think it is intended to be. In other words, whether
the scenario in the fictional idea applies to one, a few or all
members of a group. The intuition behind this is that an idea
that is generalised to a large number of members of a group
is less plausible than an idea that only involves one member.
For instance, from the statement:
“What if there was a young girl who went through a rabbit hole
and found herself in a strange and mysterious land where animals
could talk and everyone is mad?” (2)
The implicit universally quantified sentences “animals could
talk” and “everyone is mad” decrease the plausibility of the
idea. We hypothesise that there is a negative correlation be-
tween universality and plausibility.
Openness How open to subjective interpretation an idea
is perceived to be. Our intuition is that if an idea that is
composed of statements that are ambiguous or not specific,
for which the reader can provide different interpretations or
scenarios, is perceived as more plausible. As an example,
take the statement:
“What if there was a young man who kept a painting of himself
which aged while he himself stayed young?” (3)
Here, “stayed young” could be interpreted both in terms of
not looking old or actually not ageing, while the painting that
“aged” could have been painted in highly impermanent ma-
terials. The possible explanations (natural youthfulness and
cheap paint, or a bizarre medical condition) differ strongly in
their plausibility; if there is a choice, a subject might choose
the more plausible explanation. We hypothesise that there is
a positive correlation between openness and plausibility.
Causality The level of connectivity between the compo-
nents that make up an idea. In other words, how naturally
the statements that make up an idea lead coherently from
one to the other. The intuition behind this is that plausibility
increases when the statements of an idea are clearly con-
nected so as to serve as supporting arguments themselves.
To illustrate this, take the example:
“What if there was a little doctor who couldn’t take a pulse?” (4)
Without an explanation as to why the doctor is unable to per-
form the common task of taking a pulse, this statement will
likely score low for plausibility. We hypothesise that there is
a positive correlation between causality and plausibility.
Familiarity The level of awareness of the overall scenario
relative to known ideas. Although this is a subjective factor,
the intuition behind it is that our perception of plausibility
is affected by common themes, scenarios and characters that
figure more commonly in culture. Statement (1) illustrates
this intuition. Well-known character stereotypes such as an
orphan girl, an evil aunt and a mentally ill woman render
the statement more plausible. We hypothesise that there is a
positive correlation between familiarity and plausibility.
Feasibility How well the elements within an idea fit within
the overall scenario. The intuition behind this is that plau-
sibility increases if an element; e.g., a character, is better
suited to one situation than another. To illustrate, the state-
ment:
“What if there was a little cat who learned how to use a phone?” (5)
Would rank lower in plausibility if instead of a cat, the sub-
ject was an inanimate object, for instance a cooker due to
the affordances of the subjects. We hypothesise that there is
a positive correlation between feasibility and plausibility.
An Exploratory Categorisation Study
To further explore the factors underlying human plausibil-
ity judgements, we conducted a categorisation study where
the above candidate factors guided the selection of the stim-
uli for, and design of, the study. In the study, participants
were asked to assign machine- and human-generated fic-
tional ideas into different categories of plausibility. We col-
lected both quantitative and qualitative data from these ses-
sions, which were then separately analysed and interpreted:
1) the raw categorisation results were used to calculate ex-
plorative statistics; 2) participant think aloud commentaries
and post-task interviews formed the basis of a grounded the-
ory analysis (Adams, Lunt, and Cairns 2008), identifying
key factors in their categorisation process. 3) The categori-
sation results were transformed into similarity data for a
multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis (Borg and Groe-
nen 2005) of the fictional ideas, to collect more evidence on
the underlying dimensions which influenced the plausibil-
ity categorisations; By studying the same plausibility judge-
ments qualitatively and quantitatively, we hoped to triangu-
late the results to arrive at a final set of factors. A categorisa-
tion task with physical cards, as opposed to ordinary Likert-
scale rating, was deliberately chosen to promote think-aloud
comments and the comparison of stimuli. These methods
are well-suited to exploring complex and poorly conceptu-
alised domains, e.g., see Wallraven et al. (2009) or Gow et
al. (2010).
Stimuli We used 28 fictional ideas in total, consisting of
18 ideas generated by The What-If Machine (three from
each of the six categories the system currently supports:
“Disney”, “Metaphors”, “Utopian/Dystopian”, “Alternative
Scenarios”, “Kafkaesque” and “Musicals”), 7 ideas sum-
marising well-known fictional literature works (“Literary
Fiction”), and 3 ideas that used known fictional characters
or worlds (“Fiction in Fiction”). We also selected a subset
of six ideas (from the 28 already selected) for the partici-
pants to verbally elaborate on in more detail. A selection of
stimuli from each category can be found in Table 1.
Method Participants took part in the study individually
and were all read the same introductory material. Each ses-
sion was audio recorded for later analysis. We first asked
them to sort the 28 stimuli, provided as paper cards, into
four plausibility categories:
1. Highly implausible: describe scenarios that have very
little grounding in your experience of reality.
2. Slightly implausible: describe scenarios that have a low
degree of grounding in your experience of reality.
3. Slightly plausible: describe scenarios that are somewhat
grounded in your experience of reality.
4. Highly plausible: describe scenarios that have a high de-
gree of grounding in your experience of reality.
An “I don’t understand” category was also provided. In
contrast to our introspective study, we chose four categories
to eliminate the neutral choice. Participants were not told
that some of the statements had been written by software,
nor asked if they recognised those from human-authored
narratives.
We asked participants to think aloud while performing
this task, i.e., to articulate their categorisation process and
rationale. For some participants (see below) this was fol-
lowed by open-ended questions where these issues were
probed in greater depth, focusing on the six statements
which we had pre- selected, or others highlighted during
the categorisation study. Finally, we asked some partic-
ipants explicit questions about our candidate factors (de-
scribed above), to determine if they considered them rele-
vant. For instance, regarding complexity we asked: “Do you
believe that a complex fictional statement; that is, with a
large amount of conditions, makes the plausibility higher,
lower or neither?”. Each such question was accompanied by
an example statement.
Id Mean Var. Ag. NAs Stimulus Category
5 2.00 1.44 14 0 What if we could give life to a being created by combining the body
parts of dead people?
Literary Fiction
8 0.39 0.72 16 1 What if a zombie rugby-tackled a ghost and broke his leg? Fiction in Fiction
12 0.38 0.78 14 3 What if there was a little pen who forgot how to write? Disney
14 2.50 0.62 15 1 What if ignorant fools were to overcome mistakes, establish cults
and become knowledgeable gurus?
Metaphors
19 1.69 1.03 9 3 What if the world suddenly had lots more assassins? Then there
would be more antidotes, since assassins use the poisons that require
antidotes.
Utopia / Dystopia
20 0.44 0.61 15 1 What if there was an old fish, who couldn’t swim anymore, which
he used to do for relaxation, so decided instead to get drunk?
Alternative
21 0.94 1.31 11 2 What if there was an old car that could be used as the space for
holding a star?
Alternative
24 0.17 0.26 17 1 What if a bicycle appeared in a dog pound, and suddenly became a
dog that was able to drive an automobile?
Kafkaesque
26 2.72 0.21 18 1 What if a wounded soldier had to learn how to understand a child in
order to find true love?
Musicals
28 2.06 0.43 14 2 What if a janitor needed to suppress a rebellion in order to gain
admiration?
Musicals
Table 1: A selection of stimuli, with response mean and variance. Ag.= participants agreeing with most common response.
NAs = times classified as “Don’t understand”.
Participants In total, 20 participants took part in the
study, although one participant’s data was excluded (see be-
low). Of the remaining 19, 4 participants were female and
15 male. 8 participants were in the age range 18-24 years
old, 9 were 25-34, and 2 were 35-44. 4 of them specified A
levels as their current level of education, 7 had a first degree,
6 a higher degree, and 2 a doctorate. 7 participants were flu-
ent in English, 11 were native speakers, and one self-rated
as “intermediate”, but was considered fluent. We assumed
that the lack of demographic diversity would have limited
impact on our results, although future studies could make
some provision for variations related to gender, age or ed-
ucational background, e.g., cultural references. Participants
did not have familiarity with our work on plausibility prior
to taking part the study.
All participants were paid £10 and undertook the cate-
gorisation experiment. Only 12 were asked the open-ended
questions and questions about the candidate factors. This al-
lowed us to constrain the amount of data collected for the
grounded theory analysis, while satisfying representative-
ness for the quantitative analysis. One participant was a very
distinct outlier in terms of categorisation mean and variance,
as they classified most statements into either “highly implau-
sible” or “I don’t understand”. They were perfectly aware of
the meaning but didn’t agree with the logic of the statement.
Their think aloud data also suggested that they did not en-
gage with the task as requested. We therefore excluded this
participant from the analysis that follows.
Categorisation Results
Of the 532 judgements made, the most common were
“highly implausible” (34%) and “highly plausible” (25%),
followed closely by “slightly plausible” (23%). The least
common responses were “slightly implausible” (11%) and
“don’t understand” (7%). In the analysis below, we some-
times interpret these ordinal responses (excluding “don’t un-
derstand”) as interval data from 0 (highly implausible) to 3
(highly plausible). Table 1 shows the response mean and
variance for a selection of stimuli.
By Participant All participants used the entire range of
responses. There were notable individual differences: 4
participants had median response of “highly implausible”,
8 had “slightly plausible”, with the remaining 7 medians
falling in-between. The variance for each stimuli provides a
measure of agreement between participants: the mean vari-
ance was 0.93 (min 0.21, max 1.49), suggesting quite a high
level of disagreement. However, if we ignore the distinction
between highly and slightly and merge categories to plausi-
ble/implausible/don’t understand, we actually see many par-
ticipants agreeing with the modal (most popular) category:
for 68% of stimuli, at least two-thirds agree. This shows at
least a weak consensus was often present.
Participants used the “I don’t understand this statement”
category a median of 1 times, indicating comprehension was
not a problem for most participants. Only one participant
claimed to understand all stimuli and, at the other extreme,
two didn’t understand six stimuli. Using Spearman’s ρ, there
is a medium negative correlation (ρS(28) = −0.4, p =
0.09) between not understanding and use of “Highly im-
plausible” and a medium positive correlation (ρS(28) =
0.35, p = 0.1) between not understanding and that partic-
ipant’s mean plausibility. This suggests there may be some
confusion between “don’t understand” and “implausible”,
which should be addressed in the design of future studies.
By Stimuli Almost all the stimuli provoked the full range
of responses, confirming that assessing plausibility is a
highly subjective task. The mean response for each stimuli
ranged from 0.17 (Stimuli 24) to 2.84. The variance ranged
from 0.21 (Stimuli 26) to 1.49. We compared the plausibil-
ity ratings between the different stimulus groups described
above. A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance indi-
cated that the plausibility ratings between the eight groups
were significantly different H(7) = 80, p < 1e − 13. We
then performed a series of Wilcoxon rank sum post-hoc tests
with Bonferroni correction to determine which of the groups
are significantly different. The p-values and group means are
listed in Table 2. It shows, amongst others things, that state-
ments from the categories “Musicals” and “Metaphor” were
rated highest in plausibility (µ = 2.33, µ = 1.76), and differ
significantly from the categories that were considered highly
implausible, namely “Kafkaesque” and “Utopia/Dystopia”
(µ = 0.56, µ = 1.06).
Think Aloud Results
To understand the factors which contributed to participants’
plausibility judgements, we performed a grounded theory
analysis of the think aloud data. Grounded theory is a qual-
itative research method that is used to build, validate and
expand theories from data, in order to reach “a theoreti-
cal formulation of the reality under investigation” (Corbin
and Strauss 1990). Our analysis validated four of our initial
hypothesised factors as influential within our participants’
judgements: openness, familiarity, causality and feasibility;
the other two, complexity and universality, were concluded
as non-influential. An additional factor, perception of real-
ity was identified. Furthermore, for each of the supported
factors, we identified a set of properties that represent the
different ways the participants talked about the factors, as
well as dimensions describing values these properties can
hold. These results are summarised in Table 3.
Participants often based their judgement on how Familiar
they were with the content; either from experience (own or
by others) or knowledge they have acquired from different
mediums. An illustrative example is Statement (1), quoted
earlier to highlight the Complexity dimension. Two partici-
pants said the following:
“Doesn’t go with things in this time and day but people’s lives are
complicated [...]”
“you see similar situations in the news [...] these are different
personalities that actually exists [...]”
Consequently, this statement was often classified in the plau-
sible spectrum (10 as highly plausible and 8 as slightly plau-
sible). Familiarity at the level of cultural recognition also af-
fects plausibility judgements. For instance, despite the fact
that the statement: What if a zombie rugby-tackled a ghost
and broke his leg?, contains fictional characters, as these are
well-known concepts that form part of our culture, partici-
pants would hesitate about their plausibility value (even if
eventually most decided the statement was not plausible).
Openness was also a recurrent factor we identified from
the recorded sessions. Often, participants would try to make
sense of the statements, saying things such as:
‘Maybe because my brain [is trying to give] sense to sentences.’
‘Where there is more room for interpretation, it is more easy to be
black or white.’
Ambiguity and context played an important role for this
factor. We found that key concepts appearing in a state-
ment made a significant difference in plausibility judge-
ments when these could be interpreted in different ways, and
there was not enough context to narrow down the intended
meaning. This led participants to stick with their favourite
interpretation and provide their judgement accordingly. To
illustrate, regarding the statement ‘What if there was an old
car that could be used as the space for holding a star?’, par-
ticipants would often ask if the concept star meant the as-
trological object or a celebrity, with most of the participants
selecting the former and consequently placing this statement
within the implausible spectrum. A similar reasoning was
common with statement (4) above, for which participants
would consider the concept of the little doctor as being ei-
ther a child or a doctor short in height. Most participants
chose the former interpretation and placed the statement in
the plausible spectrum.
Feasibility was also one of the factors used by the partici-
pants when judging plausibility. In particular, we found that
they would consider if the likelihood of the statement would
form a usual or unusual scenario to decide on its plausibil-
ity. This was often seen in statements like (1), where the
co-occurrence of all the elements of the statement was seen
as unusual – but still plausible. One participant said:
‘it’s quite a complicated story but elements of the story makes it
feel more real.’
Additionally, feasibility was also accounted for based on the
use of stereotypes and how the individual parts of the state-
ment fit together with a stereotypical construct. To illustrate,
take the statement: What if the world suddenly had lots more
dictators? Then there would be less neediness, since dicta-
tors abuse the victims that demonstrate neediness, for which
a handful of participants focused on the contradiction be-
tween the concept of dictators, which has negative connota-
tions, and the concept of less neediness, which has positive
connotations.
Specific keywords, in particular attributes of the concepts
in the statement, were also a decisive property when judg-
ing the statement based on its feasibility. For instance, the
use of the adjective little in statement (4) made the plausi-
bility higher, since participants interpreted the scenario as a
child playing doctor who is not able to actually take a pulse,
which in their view was completely feasible.
We also found that, although causality was not a strong
factor in the decision making process, it was present on
some occasions. In particular, finding arguments in favour
or against particular elements of a statement had an influ-
ence in plausibility judgements. For instance, the statement:
What if the world suddenly had lots more assassins? Then
there would be more antidotes, since assassins use the poi-
sons that require antidotes, links the concept of assassins
with the concept of poisons, and this itself to the concept of
antidotes. Although this statement was built through well-
attested associations, specifically that assassins use poisons,
and that poisons require antidotes, the intended strong link
between assassins and poisons was used constantly as an ar-
gument against the plausibility of the statement. In contrast,
from the statement: What if there was a punishable man
who had to learn how to eat a person in order to achieve
his dream of becoming a criminal?, the link between ‘eating
Category Literary Fiction Fiction in Fiction Disney Metaphors Utopia / Dystopia Alternative Kafkaesque Musicals
Mean Plausibility 1.71 1.11 1.37 1.76 1.06 1.12 0.56 2.33
Fiction in Fiction 0.11394 - - - - - - -
Disney 1.00000 1.00000 - - - - - -
Metaphors 1.00000 0.16271 1.00000 - - - - -
Utopia / Dystopia 0.07103* 1.00000 1.00000 0.08518* - - - -
Alternative 0.14113 1.00000 1.00000 0.19369 1.00000 - - -
Kafkaesque 5.9e-07** 0.48768 0.00455** 2.4e-06** 0.31448 0.44275 - -
Musicals 0.09299* 3.5e-05** 0.00039** 0.23095 5.9e-06** 4.4e-05** 1.9e-11** -
Table 2: p-values from pairwise comparisons of stimuli groups using Wilcoxon rank sum test and Bonferroni correction.
Significance: * low (α < 0.1) and ** high (α < 0.01). The second row comprises plausibility means for all categories.
a person’ and becoming a ‘criminal’ was seen as logically
connected:
‘I can imagine eating a person as an act of initiation for a person
to be part of a gang...’
Interestingly, the idea of unknowns was also used as an
argument to decide on a plausibility category. This is when
a participant considered that he/she did not have enough
knowledge to argue against or in favour of a particular sce-
nario. An example of this was the statement: What if the
ministry of magic paid JK Rowling to write her books so we
muggles would think magic is fiction?:
‘I don’t know if there is a minister of magic [...] who knows?’
which some participants used as an argument to assign a
higher plausibility value.
Lastly, perception of reality played a role for some indi-
viduals when making their judgements. This factor repre-
sents how people may account for different ways of perceiv-
ing reality within certain scenarios. To illustrate, a partici-
pant categorised statement (1) as highly plausible based on
the following reasoning:
“From my experience of reality, that might happen in some
psychedelic state, a dream state, an imaginary state. I don’t think
it’s right to count what happens in these states as any less real [...]
the rabbit hole could be a doorway to other states. That’s an idea
I’m definitely open to.”
another participant questioned the meaning of reality:
‘[...] what is reality? Different statements push different readings
of what reality is: objective reality in terms of things that are phys-
ically possible for ever and ever, things that might be possible in
Factor Properties Dimensions
Familiarity
Experience Own/Others
Knowledge Cultural/Heard/Read/Seen
Cultural recognition Conceptual/Factual
Openness Ambiguity Most/Least plausibleContext Lack/Presence of
Feasibility
Likelihood Usual/Unusual
Stereotypes Confirmation/Contradiction
Attributes Opened/Specific
Causality Arguments In favour/Against/UnknownsContext Lack/Presence of
Perception of
reality
Abstraction Conceptual/Physical
Cultural influence Background/Beliefs
Table 3: Influential factors when judging plausibility.
the future with technology, things that kind of work in a fictional
world, and things that don’t work at all.’
This is a subjective factor, but the intuition behind it is that
judgements of plausibility are affected by personal views of
what can be considered to be real or not.
Within this factor, abstraction was found to be a common
property. In this case, the overall scenario was considered
as having a hidden meaning. To illustrate, the statement:
What if the world suddenly had lots more angels? Then there
would be more barriers, since angels serve the gods that
impose the laws that create barriers, was abstracted by some
participants:
‘I don’t believe in angels or God, but I think the government can
use it as a tool to manage people.’
leading them to assign a higher plausibility value to the state-
ment. Similarly, cultural influence played a role in how
participants’ perception of reality would affect plausibility.
Take the statement: What if respected senators were to retire
from their senates, join gangs and become shady gangsters?,
which was implausible for many participants because it did
not make sense with their notion of reality:
‘there is no reason why a senator with power and money would
choose to be a gangster’
while for others, this was a plausible scenario due to their
cultural background, where this situation was feasible:
‘[...] in certain very corrupt countries it actually happens [...] when
they are senators they belong to gangs, legal ones, but they do [...]
and when they retire they keep being part of those clubs’
Likewise, the statement What if a janitor needed to suppress
a rebellion in order to gain admiration? was classified as
slightly plausible because:
‘this is kind of a standard Hollywood plot really, I can imagine that
being played by Tom Cruise [...] it has high degree of grounding
in my experience of reality [...] not my experience of reality, my
experience of Hollywood film making’
suggesting the participant considered the fictional world of
Hollywood films as a type of reality.
Complexity, as mentioned before, did not come across as
an influential factor for plausibility. For instance, regarding
the complexity of statement (1), a participant highlighted:
‘All happening at once is unlikely but it’s possible [...] that doesn’t
change the plausibility.’
instead, this factor was considered to sometimes make the
statements more difficult to understand. Universality, on the
other hand, was seen as a factor that would make a state-
ment more interesting, but would not have a significant ef-
fect on its plausibility value, specially when the statement
was placed in the implausible spectrum:
‘if you are in the implausible categories, then it doesn’t matter,
one, many [...] we are talking about something that is not real, so
it doesn’t matter’
Multidimensional Scaling Results
We performed an multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis
to quantitatively derive a set of factors from the categorisa-
tion results, and to assess their influence on the overall judg-
ment. Classic MDS maps measurements of (dis-) similarity
among pairs of stimuli to distances between points in a geo-
metric space (Borg and Groenen 2005, p. 3). In this space,
each dimension can be considered a factor which influenced
the initial similarity judgement. The meaning of a dimen-
sion is a matter of interpretation, based on the distribution of
stimuli along it and their properties.
First, we had to determine the pairwise similarities be-
tween stimuli. The effort of collecting this data manually in-
creases exponentially with the number of stimuli; we there-
fore followed a different approach suggested by Wallraven
et al. (2009), where pairwise similarities are derived from
a categorisation task. This approach allowed us to re-use
our previously collected data, while implicitly grounding the
similarities in plausibility judgements. We started with an
empty similarity matrix, and increased the similarity value
of two stimuli if they were put into the same plausibility
group. This was repeated for all participants and normalised.
We then determined how many dimensions have to be
used to approximate the data well enough by looking at how
much variance in the data each dimension accounts for (Borg
and Groenen 2005, pp. 247). We cut off at three dimensions,
accounting for 78% of the variance, with the first dimen-
sion covering 57%. We then visualised each of these as a
one-dimensional axis with the stimuli projected along it, al-
lowing us to compare the relative distribution of the stimuli.
These visualisations were given to four of the authors for
interpretation, informed by the think-aloud results. A con-
sensus interpretation of each dimension was then agreed on.
These are summarised in Table 4, along with some examples
of high and low scoring stimuli from Table 1.
On the first dimension, statements that showed a strong
deviation from reality were grouped in one extreme. On the
other extreme were statements that were more aligned with
the rules of what it is commonly agreed as possible. The
dimension was identified as feasibility. The second dimen-
sion was strongly associated with interpretability, i.e. with
the stimuli’s openness to interpretation. Interestingly, the
stimuli in both extremes were found to have different in-
terpretations; however, what separated one group from the
other was how ambiguous the possible interpretations were
assessed to be. In one extreme, an interpretation would al-
low for a more decisive judgement, while in the other, the
interpretation would still be seen as not convincing. The
third dimension was found to classify stimuli based on fa-
miliarity. Well known elements, similar stories, common
characters and stereotypes were identified in one extreme,
while the other extreme presented the same characteristics
(i.e. familiar elements) used in contradictory ways.
Example stimuli (Id)
Dim Var High Low Interpretation
1 57% 14, 26, 28 8, 12, 24 Feasibility
2 12% 5 28 Openness
3 9% 14, 26 19, 28 Familiarity
Table 4: The first three dimensions identified by MDS.
Future Work
This study provides evidence for three factors — feasibility,
openness to interpretation, and familiarity — that contribute
to judgements about the plausibility of fictional ideas. Un-
derstanding these factors is a necessary step towards further
experimental investigation in this area. We plan to further
test and refine this theory, and use it to design studies on the
perception of machine-generated fictions.
We intend to model these factors computationally within
the What-If Machine, to control the plausibility of the fic-
tional ideas it generates. This could enhance the useful-
ness of the software and perhaps increase the cultural value
of the ideas it produces. Although further experimentation
is needed, we believe that metrics which predict values for
each of the factors can be devised. Moreover, these could be
used to predict the plausibility judgement that certain types
of people will make for particular fictional statements.
A heuristic approach to analyse whether a statement is
open to interpretation can be based on the concreteness
scores of its constituent keywords. This measures the level
of ambiguity of these words and give an approximation of
the concreteness of the overall scenario. We have formalised
fictional statements within the WHIM project as short nar-
ratives composed of narrative points that are either linked
through causal relations, assumed by the reader, or given by
the knowledge base (Llano et al. 2016). This formalism al-
lows us to represent each statement as a graph over which we
can reason. For instance, analysing the connectivity within
the graph may allow us to hypothesise the level of contextual
support within the statement as a whole. Highly supported
statements may be less open to interpretation.
Feasibility, on the other hand, could be accounted for
through the use of techniques such as a distributional seman-
tics vector space model (Mikolov et al. 2015). Specifically,
how well the elements of a statement fit together could be
measured by studying their semantic similarity as well as
their shared contextual co-occurrences. Stereotypical prop-
erties of concepts can be mined from the web (Veale 2012).
A similar method could be followed in order to assess stereo-
types within a statement and compare the polarity between
the stereotypes and the other elements in the statement.
Finally, although familiarity is a subjective factor, met-
rics could be defined by establishing links with the informa-
tion in knowledge bases of common knowledge and narra-
tive constructs. In this context, strongly linked data can be
seen as connected to “known or familiar scenarios”.
Progress in fictional ideation has general implications for
Computational Creativity. In the problem solving paradigm
of AI, intelligent tasks to automate are broken down into
a series of problems to be solved, and there is a usually a
‘right answer’ to these problems whether local or global, or
at least a fitness function relating to the potential value of so-
lutions, which ordinarily captures notions of value from the
real world. In the artefact generation paradigm of AI, how-
ever, an intelligence task to automate is considered as an in-
vitation to create something of value in a potentially interest-
ing way. Value can be externally imposed, but some Com-
putational Creativity projects have allowed software to in-
vent its own measures of value and to motivate these through
framing (Charnley, Pease, and Colton 2012).
We can use the above observations on plausibility to set
ourselves apart somewhat further from mainstream AI. In
particular, Computational Creativity research could be seen
as the sub-field focused on AI for what could be rather than
what is best. Approaches to generate information about pos-
sible worlds naturally includes making discoveries about the
real universe around us. However, it also includes the inven-
tion of imagined scenarios specifically constructed to reflect
alternative realities. Such scenarios, like those produced by
The What-If Machine, are valuable not because of their ex-
plicit reflection of reality, but because they force us to see the
realities of our own existence in new and thought-provoking
ways (in addition to simply providing entertainment). Anal-
yses building on the work presented here could be influential
in the advancement of the automatic generation of fictional
universes and other creative works. Predicting how plausi-
ble (or not) people judge an idea to be will be a key part of
automatically producing imagined scenarios.
Conclusions
We conducted a study in which participants categorised hu-
man authored and machine generated fictional statements
(including the one paraphrased in the title of this paper), in
terms of their plausibility. Unlike previous studies, in which
the notion of plausibility had only operational significance,
we explored the constituent factors of plausibility, in order
to determine which are most influential. We found that the
three most influential factors when judging plausibility are:
feasibility, which determines how well the elements of an
idea fit within the overall scenario, openness to subjective
interpretation, and familiarity, which specifies the level of
awareness of the overall scenario relative to known ideas.
Our findings can serve as a theoretical grounding for future
cognitive and computational studies involving plausibility,
as well as informing wider discussions about perceptions of
fictionality. We hope to build on this work to improve the
cultural value of machine-generated fictions and to make fic-
tional ideation a central part of Computational Creativity.
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